Should Britain look to the Abundance Agenda?
Derek Thompson and Ezra Klein's Abundance is a masterpiece of policy strategy that has significantly energised the Democratic policy community (or "wonk world") in the US. The book meticulously outlines the various logjams within the American governance system that stymie action, regardless of its alignment with particular agendas.
In the book, the authors artfully describe the interplay between regulations and special interest groups, and how these forces have fostered a "Frankenstein ‘Everything Bagel’ liberalism" that seeks to use every government policy as a panacea for all of society's ills. For instance, the book details how the Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO) for the CHIPS and Sciences Act required semiconductor manufacturers—whom the act aimed to attract to build in the US—to outline their plans for promoting female inclusion in construction and fostering inclusivity across their supply chains. While these objectives are noble, I concur with the book's assessment that this approach arguably represents an abdication of governmental responsibility, effectively making semiconductor manufacturers accountable for the business practices of their potential subcontractors. Many, I am sure, would disagree; and while the desire to rectify society's ills through public expenditure is understandable, the addition of each new requirement incurs a real opportunity cost. The pertinent question then becomes: is this trade-off justifiable given the Act's primary objective—in this case, building domestic supply chains for national security?
Another segment of Abundance focuses on invention, revealing how government structures for grant deployment mean that scientists spend a significant portion of their time (close to half, according to the book) on clerical work related to grant applications or progress updates. Additionally, the authors suggest that the overarching system, due to its cautious approach, rewards incrementalism and penalises innovative breakthroughs. The book thus highlights worrying trends plaguing US innovation, demonstrating an almost certain reduction in overall dynamism as a consequence.
However, the book also showcases how government, rather than being a hindrance, can be an accelerant to innovation. Here, Abundance adopts a more hopeful tone, culminating in the promotion of a "politics of abundance" over scarcity. In doing so, Thompson and Klein outline the need to empower civil servants to do their work effectively, trusting their judgment rather than inhibiting them with lengthy processes and regulations designed to slow government action, even when speed is essential.
In sum, I broadly agree with the book's thesis. It offers an invaluable framework for politicians and government officials to re-evaluate policies and actions by prioritizing successful outcomes over soundbites or sheer expenditure. At a broader level, it advocates for a "YIMBYism (Yes In My Backyard) for everything" agenda. This approach seeks to measure progress against stated missions (e.g., Net Zero, housebuilding, high-speed rail) and to better allocate capital towards "moonshots" to foster greater innovation.
The challenge for Thompson and Klein, I believe, will be addressing criticisms from the Left. These include concerns that the "abundance agenda" is merely a rebirth of neoliberalism—a critique some might readily dismiss—and that it risks disempowering local communities, even if these communities are already influenced by special interest groups whose representativeness is questionable.
Personally, I would go further than the authors, arguing that the excessive delays and cost add-ons stemming from requirements tangentially related to a policy's stated aim can constitute a form of de facto corruption. When measuring project costs, it is essential to assess the true cost of construction and implement ceilings on cost overruns. If public projects regularly double in cost and deployment time compared to their projected deliverables, this, in itself, can be seen as another form of corruption. In an attempt to root out one type of corruption (e.g., bribery) by instituting complex, time-consuming processes, policymakers may have inadvertently fostered another—by diverting time and money towards administrative overhead and carve-outs for special interest groups.
Readers in the UK will be familiar with the challenges of compounding costs for public projects and an increasingly unaffordable housing crisis. Additionally, many will recognize similar contributing factors, even if the specific manifestations of these challenges differ.
The UK’s principal challenge, in this regard, lies within its planning framework. Thankfully, much has been written to explain the unique origins of the UK’s rapid inflation in its housing costs, a crisis deeply rooted in this very system. A particularly illuminating example is the Institute of Economic Affairs' (IEA) recent foreword to the 2025 edition of Professor Alan Evans’s remarkably prescient 1988 book, No Room! No Room!
The IEA highlights that, even before the housing crisis reached its current, undeniable severity (with house price-to-earnings ratios now exceeding eight nationally and rents consuming over a quarter of median gross incomes), Evans identified the core issue. His central thesis, as recounted, was that Britain’s house price inflation was fundamentally land price inflation. He argued that 'The planning system has evolved... into a system to control and restrict development,' creating an artificial scarcity of land with planning permission while agricultural land remained abundant but largely inaccessible for building.
Evans observed the nascent dynamics of what we now call NIMBYism, noting how 'residents always oppose any development near to them,' and the 'major asymmetry' where potential beneficiaries of new housing remain unrepresented. This system, he presciently argued, would not only lead to a shortage of homes—now evident in the UK having fewer, and smaller, housing units per capita than most OECD counterparts—but also generate significant 'second-order and third-order effects.' These include shortages of business premises, suppressed wages, hindered productivity due to restricted labor mobility from high housing costs in productive areas, and distorted savings patterns.
The IEA’s decision to republish Evans’s work underscores a crucial point: the fundamental drivers of the UK's housing crisis were clearly identifiable decades ago. As the foreword states, 'The fact that it was possible to see this so clearly as far back as 1988 makes it all the more scandalous that we have still not made any progress toward solving this issue.' This historical perspective provides a stark British parallel to the 'Abundance' agenda's concerns about systemic blockages hindering necessary development, a sentiment gaining traction across the UK.
The costs that the planning process can impose are indeed eye-watering, and the need for such reforms is starkly illustrated by projects like the Lower Thames Crossing. For this £10bn road scheme, National Highways, a government-owned company, submitted a planning application reportedly exceeding 359,000 pages. As highlighted in an article in CIty AM, this documentation phase alone cost over £267 million, with total taxpayer expenditure reaching approximately £800 million before any construction had even begun—for a process already 15 years in the making. Sam Richards of the pro-growth campaign group Britain Remade described the situation as "symbolic of what is wrong with our planning system," calling the application's sheer volume "insane and totally unjustifiable" (Taylor).
Recognizing these deep-seated planning challenges, the new Labour government has introduced the Planning and Infrastructure Bill. They describe it as 'central to the government’s plan to get Britain building again and deliver economic growth,' aiming to 'speed up and streamline the delivery of new homes and critical infrastructure' (MHCLG).
According to the government, the Bill focuses on several key areas:
Faster Infrastructure Projects: Making the approval process for essential projects like energy networks, roads, and public transport quicker and more predictable. This includes cutting down on some consultation steps and limiting opportunities for legal challenges that cause delays.
Smarter Nature Protection: Creating a new "Nature Restoration Fund." The idea is to allow development to proceed while also ensuring that environmental impacts are not just offset, but that nature recovery is actively supported in a more strategic way.
Clearer Planning Decisions: Improving how local planning decisions are made. This involves changes to planning fees so local authorities have the resources they need, and clarifying which decisions can be made by planning officers versus local committees.
Unlocking Land for Building: Making it easier for public bodies to assemble land for large projects and new communities, including changes to how landowners are compensated when land is bought through compulsory purchase.
Better Regional Planning: Introducing "Spatial Development Strategies" to ensure that different local areas work together on bigger-picture planning for housing and infrastructure, rather than planning in isolation.
These wide-ranging proposals—from updating national policies and consultation rules to reforming how planning committees work and land is acquired—show the government directly acknowledging and attempting to tackle the kinds of systemic hurdles that Thompson and Klein discuss in Abundance, and that figures like Evans pointed out decades ago. It's a clear effort to overhaul established procedures to boost national development and economic growth.
Beyond these top-down reforms, there's also growing advocacy for more localized, community-driven planning solutions, exemplified by groups like London Yimby and their promotion of concepts from publications such as Strong Suburbs: Enabling streets to control their own development by Dr. Samuel Hughes and Ben Southwood of Policy Exchange. This report champions "street votes," where residents on a street could, by a high majority, agree to new design rules allowing for "gentle intensification"—for example, redeveloping bungalows into terraces.
Hughes and Southwood's proposal suggests this "street vote" model could unlock significant benefits:
More Homes with Local Consent: Potentially adding 110,000 homes annually by empowering residents, avoiding greenfield development.
Financial Incentives: Offering substantial value uplift for participating homeowners and new revenue for local authorities.
Better, Greener Places: Supporting local amenities and requiring net-zero carbon standards for new builds, while including safeguards like height limits and protections for heritage sites (Hughes and Southwood).
This "street vote" model aims to align the incentives of existing residents with housing needs, fostering organic growth and turning potential opponents into advocates for development. It represents an innovative bottom-up approach to planning reform, complementing the top-down government initiatives.
In posing the question, 'Should Britain look to the Abundance Agenda?', the intention was not to imply a deficit in Britain's own understanding of its obstacles. The enduring relevance of Professor Evans's work, coupled with contemporary reform efforts like the Planning and Infrastructure Bill and the community-level advocacy of London Yimby, clearly shows a domestic awareness of the necessary actions. Britain, for the most part, knows many of the steps it needs to take.
The real utility, then, of observing the stir caused by Klein and Thompson's Abundance is twofold: first, to find solidarity in shared global challenges, and second, to appreciate the power of a cohesive, optimistic vision. It's this vision that I believe is key. Beyond the specific policy mechanics, much of which are already in motion or under debate in the UK, the 'Abundance Agenda' serves as a powerful reminder of what we stand to gain. The UK needs not just piecemeal reforms, but a compelling and widely embraced vision for a better urban future—one that articulates the immense potential unlocked by building more, building smarter, and building with a shared sense of purpose. Abundance helps to frame that aspirational 'why,' which is as crucial as the technical 'how'.
References
Klein, Ezra, and Derek Thompson. Abundance: How We Build a Better Future. Profile Books Ltd, 2025.
Niemietz, Kristian. "New foreword to the 2025 edition." Foreword to No Room! No Room!, by Alan Evans, Institute of Economic Affairs, 2025.
Taylor, Guy. "Lower Thames Crossing planning application becomes UK’s longest ever – at more than 350,000 pages, and costing almost £300m." City A.M., 15 Jan. 2024 United Kingdom, Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government. "Guide to the Planning and Infrastructure Bill." GOV.UK, 13 May 2024, www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-planning-and-infrastructure-bill/guide-to-the-planning-and-infrastructure-bill.
London Yimby: https://www.londonyimby.org/ Hughes, Samuel, and Ben Southwood. Strong Suburbs: Enabling streets to control their own development. Policy Exchange, 17 Feb. 2021.